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United States v. Coon: The End of
Detrimental Reliance for Plea
Agreements?
by
DAVID ARAM KAISER*

Introduction
Out of all of those who come before the court, we expect the
defendant in a criminal prosecution to receive the greatest
protections. However, when it comes to contracts, the civil litigant is
sometimes in a superior position to a criminal defendant. In civil
litigation, the doctrine of detrimental reliance allows a litigant to
enforce a promise when he or she has engaged in certain acts showing
reliance on that promise, but a criminal defendant who has
detrimentally relied on the terms of a proffered plea agreement' has
no comparable right to enforcement of those terms. This anomalous
situation in the law results from the holding of a case from the Eighth
Circuit, United States v. Coon.2 This Note contends that the holding
of Coon is both unfair and the result of flawed legal reasoning. This
Note argues that when a defendant is offered a plea agreement and
then detrimentally relies on it, the government should be held to
specific performance of the terms of the agreement.
Coon is an important case for criminal procedure because it
seeks to define the constitutional issues involved in detrimental
* Ph.D., English, University of California at Berkeley, 1992; J.D. Candidate,
University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2001. I would like to thank
Professor Rory K. Little of Hastings College of the Law for his valuable comments on
earlier drafts of this Note. Of course, any remaining errors are solely my responsibility.
1. By a "proffered plea agreement," I mean a plea agreement that has been offered
to a defendant (usually, but not necessarily, in writing) but has not yet been accepted by
the court and resulted in a guilty plea pursuant to the procedures of Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
2. 805 F.2d 822 (8th Cir. 1986).
[579]
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Although decided in 1986, Coon

continues to be the leading federal case on this topic and has been

followed by several other circuits in addition to the Eighth,3 such as
the Fourth, 4 the Tenth, 5 and the Eleventh, 6 and by several state

supreme courts. 7 However, no note commentary has appeared on
Coon, nor is the case discussed by the leading article on the subject of
8
prosecutorial reneging on plea agreements.

Several commentators have sought to demonstrate that there is
or should be constitutional protection for both relied-upon and un-

relied-upon proffered plea agreements. 9 As will be discussed below,
current Supreme Court precedent appears to foreclose any
constitutional protection for proffered but un-relied-on plea
agreements. This Note accepts the current limits of constitutional
protection in this area, but argues against the Coon court's
encroachment on constitutional protections of relied-upon proffered
plea agreements.
I will argue that the Coon court's handling of detrimental

reliance is erroneous in two ways. First, the Coon court defines
detrimental reliance so narrowly that the only act that qualifies is
Second, the Coon court's analysis of
involuntary pleading.
involuntary pleading is itself fatally flawed because the court ignores
modern Fifth Amendment jurisprudence on confessions and selfincrimination. I will argue that, when one applies this jurisprudence
3. See Margalli-Olvera v. INS, 43 F.3d 345, 355 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Britt,
917 F.2d 353, 359-60 (8th Cir. 1990); Stokes v. Armontrout, 851 F.2d 1085, 1090 (8th Cir.
1988); United States v. Johnson, 861 F.2d 510, 512 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v.
McGovern, 822 F.2d 739, 746 (8th Cir. 1987).
4. See United States v. West, 2 F.3d 66, 70 (4th Cir. 1993).
5. See United States v. Hurst, No. 97-7129, 1999 WL 12977 (10th Cir. Jan. 14, 1999).
6. See United States v. Kettering, 861 F.2d 675, 679 (11th Cir. 1988).
7. Davis v. State, No. 157,1992, 1992 WL 401566 (Del. Dec. 7, 1992); People v.
Navarroli, 521 N.E.2d 891, 894 (Ill. 1988).
8. See generally William M. Ejzak, Plea Bargains and Nonprosecution Agreements:
What Interests Should Be Protected When ProsecutorsRenege?, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 107.
Ejzak lays out the general history of the issue and the main division in the courts, which is
between (1) acknowledging and protecting a reliance interest in plea agreements, and (2)
only acknowledging a constitutional issue of waiver, which does not include reliance
interests. Id. at 108. Ejzak advocates that the courts should move toward acknowledging
contractual-based interests (including the reliance interest) in plea agreement
enforcement. Id. at 109. He does not discuss the question in relation to the Fifth
Amendment question of involuntary confessions, nor does he discuss Coon.
For an older, but still useful article that analyzes the constitutional waiver issue, see
generally Peter Westen & David Westin, A ConstitutionalLaw of Remedies for Broken
Plea Bargains,66 CAL. L. REV. 471 (1978).
9. This is the position urged by both Ejzak, supra note 8, at 109, and Westen &
Westin, supra note 8, at 473.

January 2001)

UNITED STATES V. COON

to the analysis of the case, the Coon court's own reasoning would
force it to acknowledge that Coon himself had detrimentally relied
upon the government's proffered plea agreement. I will conclude by
arguing that courts should generally presume detrimental reliance by
defendants in situations like Coon's, with the proviso that the
government can rebut that presumption by showing that the
defendant's reliance was not material.
I. The Facts of Coon and an Overview of the Issues
In Coon, the defendant, Gordon Wallace Coon, had been
arrested on federal narcotics charges, and was ultimately offered a
plea agreement in which the government would only charge a single
count of conspiracy in return for Coon's cooperation with the
authorities. In the letter outlining the plea agreement, the Assistant
United States Attorney stated that under the charge being brought,
the maximum prison term was fifteen years, the maximum fine was
$25,000, and that the actual sentence would be within the sole
discretion of the court.10 Coon agreed to the terms of the plea
agreement, and was subsequently interviewed by the FBI, at which
point, "as inelegantly described by the agent, [Coon] spilled his
guts."" After his confession, however, one day before Coon was to
formally enter his guilty plea in court, the District Judge informed
Coon and the Assistant United States Attorney that the statutory
maximum amount of the fine was actually $250,000, having been
increased earlier that year. 12 As a result, the Assistant United States
Attorney then submitted a second plea agreement that included the
new substantially larger fine amount, and Coon entered his guilty
plea under the second agreement. 3 Coon was sentenced to five years
in prison and fined $100,000.14 "Coon thereafter brought a motion
under Rule 35(a) 15 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
10. Coon, 805 F.2d at 822.
11. Id.
12 Id.
13. Id at 823.
14. Id. at 824.
15. Rule 35(a) states:
Correction of a sentence on remand. The court shall correct a sentence that is
determined on appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 to have been imposed in violation
of law, to have been imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the
sentencing guidelines, or to be unreasonable, upon remand of the case to the
court-(1) for imposition of a sentence in accord with the findings of the court of
appeals; or (2) for further sentencing proceedings if, after such proceedings, the
court determines that the original sentence was incorrect.
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seeking to have his fine reduced to $25,000. ' ' 16 He contended that,
because the maximum fine had been "represented to him" in the
letter that outlined the first agreement as $25,000, he had "decided to
accept the plea agreement" and he had performed "a substantial part
of his end of the agreement" by cooperating through his interview
with the FBI.17 "He argued that the court was estopped from
imposing a fine in excess of $25,000, and that the sentence was illegal
to the extent that it exceeded that amount. '18 At an evidentiary
hearing, Coon's lawyer stated that it was his opinion that after Coon
had been interviewed by the FBI, Coon felt he was "boxed in and had
no choice but to go through with the plea."1 9 The district court
denied Coon's motion, ruling "that the sentence was not an illegal
one, that it was within the statutory maximum, and that when Coon
that "the
pleaded guilty he knew that statutory maximum," and
20
sentence was entirely within the discretion of the court.
In his appeal to the Eighth Circuit, Coon argued that he had
entered his guilty plea in detrimental reliance on the erroneous
statement about the maximum fine amount contained in the first plea
agreement.2 ' He argued that his acceptance of the second agreement
was not voluntary because he had been compelled to accept the
second plea agreement because he had incriminated himself through
the statements he had made while cooperating in reliance on the first
plea agreement. 22 The Eighth Circuit rejected Coon's arguments,
using as their central premise that in the context of plea agreements
"[t]he only change in position that can be considered 'detrimental
reliance' is the actual entry of an involuntary guilty plea. ' '2 3 The court
further held that the voluntariness of Coon's guilty plea could not be
disputed because any incriminating statements that Coon may have
revealed while cooperating with authorities could have been
suppressed at trial.24 The court stated that, because Coon could have
been returned to the same legal position that he was in before he

FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a).
16. Coon, 805 F.2d at 824.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 825.
22. Id.
23. Id.

24. Id.
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cooperated with the authorities, his constitutional right to go to trial
was never infringed, and thus there was no constitutional violation32
Some initial comments are in order before I proceed to my
detailed criticism of the reasoning and holding of the case. First, I do
not feel that the overall result of the holding was grievously unjust.
Coon ended up being liable for a larger fine than he had initially
expected, but his actual prison time was ultimately substantially
reduced as a result of the government's agreement to only charge one
conspiracy count. Indeed, many would agree with the Coon court's
statement that what actually induced Coon to accept the first
agreement was his concern with prison time, not the amount of the
fine.26
Second, even if the court admitted the validity of the detrimental
reliance argument, it could have found reasons to deny specific
performance in this particular case. Here, the government did
perform all those things that it promised in the first agreement that
were in its power to perform. The government did only charge one
conspiracy count. What the government was unable to do was make
good on the erroneous maximum amount of the fine that it had
represented to Coon. It could therefore be argued that the erroneous
information about the fine amount was not really a "term" of the
agreement. Alternately, it could be argued that, even if the erroneous
fine amount information were a term, this part of the agreement
could be voided through an appeal to contractual theories of
impossibility 7 or as being contrary to public policy.28
Instead, the Coon court denied Coon's claim by restricting the
application of detrimental reliance in proffered plea agreements only
to situations of involuntary pleading. Such a restriction has and will
be used to dismiss detrimental reliance claims in cases where
dismissal of those claims would result in substantially unjust results.
Such an unjust result can be seen in a subsequent Illinois state case,
People v. Navarroli.9 As part of a proffered plea agreement, the
25. Id.

26. Id at 826. This is the alternative basis for the Court's upholding Coon's guilty

plea, namely, that even if Coon did rely on the changed term, the term was not material. I
discuss this issue in my concluding section.
27. The argument would be that it was impossible for the prosecutor to lower the
statutory fine maximum.
28. The argument would be that it is illegal for the prosecutor to contract for a lower
maximum fine than that allowed by the statute. For a detailed discussion of the use of
contractual defenses in plea agreements, see James C. Chalfant & Jack P. DiCanio,
Government Breach of PleaAgreements in FederalCourt,L.A. LAW., Apr. 1994, at 30-37.
29. 521 N.E.2d 891 (Ill. 1988).
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defendant acted as an undercover agent "at considerable risk to his
own life and safety. '30 When the defendant sought to have the state
carry out its part of the bargain by reducing the charges against the
defendant, the state denied both the existence of an agreement and
the claimed terms. 31 The Illinois Supreme Court held that, even if
there had been a plea agreement, the prosecutor's denial of the
agreement did not deprive the defendant of due process and
32
therefore the defendant was not entitled to specific performance.
The Navarrolicourt cited Coon as its authority for its analysis of plea
33
bargains and due process.
Having presented the basic facts and holding of the case, and the
reasons why the holding is important, I will now turn to a detailed
analysis and criticism of the holding and its reasoning. However, in
order to lay the groundwork for this, it will first be necessary to
review the basic law governing the formation of plea agreements.
H. Contractual Aspects of Plea Agreements
Plea bargains are often analyzed in terms of the concepts of
contract law. 34 However, this analogy is incomplete. Under current
federal case law, only the interpretation of breach of a plea agreement
is covered by contract law. 35 The formation of binding plea
agreements is not governed by pure contract law, but by Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 11 (Rule 11), which requires that the court
36
approve the plea agreement and find it to have a factual basis.
Accordingly, a plea agreement that has not been formally entered
and accepted by the trial court is said not to bind the parties even
though a contract formed similarly would be enforceable. 37 As a
general rule either party is entitled to modify its position and even
withdraw its consent to the bargain until the plea is tendered and the
38
bargain is accepted by the court.

30. Id. at 897 (Clark, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 892.
32. Id. at 893.
33. Id. at 894.
34. See generally Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargainingas Contract,101
YALE L.J. 1909 (1992).
35. See United States v. Partida-Parra, 859 F.2d 629, 633 (9th Cir. 1988).
36. Id. at 634.
37. See United States v. Fagan, 996 F.2d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Mabry v.
Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507-08 (1984)).
38. See United States v. Savage, 978 F.2d 1136, 1138 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting United
States v. Ocanas, 628 F.2d 353, 358 (5th Cir. 1980)).
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However, even though neither party is bound to a plea
agreement before it is approved at a Rule 11 hearing, the courts have

held that this general rule is subject to a detrimental reliance
exception. 39 Even if the agreement has not been finalized by the

court, both federal and state courts have consistently stated that a
defendant's detrimental reliance on a prosecutorial promise in plea
bargaining can make a plea agreement binding 40 However, until
Coon, especially in the federal courts, no cases had specifically

defined detrimental reliance in this context.
The unusual nature of a pending plea agreement-that is, that
either side can withdraw before the plea is entered in accordance with
Rule 11-is explained by the constitutional dimension of the plea
agreement. Entering the plea agreement results in the defendant's
pleading guilty,41 which constitutes a waiver of fundamental rights to
a jury trial, to confront one's accusers, to present witnesses in one's
39. IaL
40. Id. (quoting McKenzie v. Risley, 801 F.2d 1519, 1527 (9th Cir. 1986), vacated in
part on other grounds, 842 F.2d 1525 (9th Cir. 1988); cf.United States v. Aguilera, 654 F.2d
352, 354 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing defendant's failure to rely on the plea bargain offer as a
reason for allowing the prosecution to withdraw it).
State courts have reached similar results. See, e.g., State v. Superior Court, 770 P.2d
375 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (prosecutor is entitled to withdraw from plea bargain if
defendant suffers no detriment); People v. Rhoden, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 819, 824 (Ct. App.
1999) (holding that unexecuted plea bargains generally do not involve constitutional rights
absent detrimental reliance on the bargain); Petty v. State, 532 N.E.2d 610 (Ind. 1989)
(prosecutor had authority to withdraw plea bargain agreement where it had not been
reduced to writing and submitted to the trial court and where defendant's contention that
he relied on plea bargain to his detriment was not supported by the record); State v.
Crockett, 877 P.2d 1077, 1078-81 (Nev. 1994) (supporting the State's contention that a
prosecutor can withdraw a plea bargain offer anytime before a defendant pleads guilty, so
long as the defendant has not detrimentally relied on the offer); State v. O'Leary, 517
A.2d 1174 (N.H. 1986) (prosecution could withdraw from plea agreement where
defendant had not yet pleaded guilty or had not taken any steps which prejudiced his right
to a fair trial); Metheny v. State, 589 S.W.2d 943 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979) (prosecutor
could withdraw from plea bargain offer where there was no showing of irremediable
prejudice to defendant); State v. Bogart, 788 P.2d 14 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (the
prosecution could withdraw a plea proposal after learning additional facts implicating
defendant, where defendant had not yet entered guilty plea, and had failed to establish
that he detrimentally relied on bargain in such a way that a fair trial was no longer
possible).
41. A nonprosecution agreement is one in which the prosecutor agrees not to
prosecute if the defendant cooperates with the authorities, and in some of these cases then
the defendant would not be required to plead guilty as the result of such an agreement.
Such agreements fall outside the scope of this Note. For a discussion of nonprosecution
agreements see Ejzak, supra note 8, at 130-33. See also Jay M. Zitter, Annotation,
Enforceability of Agreement by Law Enforcement Officials Not to Prosecute if Accused
Would Help in Criminal Investigation or Would Become Witness Against Others, 32
A.L.R.4th 990 (1984).
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defense, to remain silent, and to be convicted by proof beyond all
reasonable doubt. 42 It is viewed as constitutionally untenable to hold
a defendant to the terms of a proposed agreement before the actual
moment that he or she actually enters the plea by pleading guilty in
open court, because to do so would in effect be forcing defendants to
waive their constitutional rights in advance of the court's
determination of the validity of the guilty plea.43
There is no comparable constitutional obstacle to requiring the
prosecution to be bound by the terms of its proffered plea agreement;
however, the law also allows the prosecutor to withdraw from a
proffered plea agreement at any time before the defendant enters a
guilty plea in court. 44 The only limitation on the prosecutor's ability
to withdraw that is generally recognized by the courts is when the
defendant has detrimentally relied on the terms of the proffered
agreement. 45
The analysis of the formation and breach of plea agreements is
thus closely connected to concepts of contract law. As I will discuss
next, in its analysis of plea agreements, the United States Supreme
Court has acknowledged these connections to contract law.
However, the Court has ultimately refused to recognize a
constitutional right that protects the full range of a defendant's
contractual expectations in plea agreement situations.

42. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,264 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 262. This concern is reflected in Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which states:
The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept such a
plea.., without first addressing the defendant personally and determining that
the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and
consequences of the plea.... The court shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of
guilty unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
44. That the prosecutor is not bound by the proffered agreement is presumably
explained by an unspoken policy determination to encourage pre-plea cooperation of the
kind that Coon rendered. Otherwise there would be no way to make sure that the
defendant would deliver pre-plea cooperation that was part of a plea agreement.
45. See supra note 40 and also the cases described in Annotation, Right of Prosecutor
to Withdraw from Plea Bargain Priorto Entry of Plea, § 3a, "Withdrawal allowed on basis
that defendant suffered no detriment," 16 A.L.R.4th 1089 (1981, Supp. 2000).
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Constitutional Aspects of the Defendant's Contractual
Interests in Plea Agreements
Plea agreements now seem a venerably established part of our
criminal justice system. 46 However, the constitutionality of plea
agreements was only recognized by the Supreme Court a little less
than thirty years ago in Santobello v. New York.47 In Santobello, the
defendant entered into a plea agreement with the prosecutor to plead
guilty to a certain offense in exchange for the prosecutor's promise to
drop a more serious charge and to refrain from making any
recommendation at sentencing. 48 However, by the time of sentencing,
a new prosecutor had replaced the one with whom Santobello had
made the deal. 49 Unaware of the previous agreement, the new
prosecutor made a recommendation for the maximum sentence.50
The Court held that Santobello had a right to some remedy for the
broken plea agreement.51 Thus, the Court expressly sanctioned plea
agreements and implicitly held that constitutional rights were
involved in their creation and enforcement. 52 However, the
precisely how, or which,
Santobello Court did not articulate
53
constitutional rights were implicated.
Santobello dealt with the question of the breach of a plea
agreement on the part of the prosecution after the defendant had
relied on it and pled guilty in court.54 However, because the Court
did not explain the precise constitutional basis of Santobello's right to
relief, some commentators sought to argue that Santobello had
opened the door for constitutional recognition of the full range of
contractual expectations of defendants, even those expectations
formed prior to the formal entry of a guilty plea.55 This full range of
expectations would include both the expectation interests in a nonexecuted contract as well as the detrimental reliance interest when
the defendant had completed his or her part of the bargain prior to
HI.

46. See Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargainingin the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L.
REV. 1471 (1993); Douglas D. Guidorizzi, Should We Really "Ban" PleaBargaining?: The
Core Concerns of PleaBargainingCritics, 47 EMORY L.J. 753 (1998).
47. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
48. Id. at 258.
49. Id. at 259.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 263.
52. See Westen & Westin, supra note 8, at 472.
53. Id. at 473.
54. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 258.
55. See Westen & Westin, supra note 8, at 472.
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the entry of the plea in court.56 Such a broad constitutional
recognition would thus have afforded to criminal plea agreement
defendants the same contractual protections available to those
57
entering into commercial contracts.
However, in Mabry v. Johnson, the Supreme Court foreclosed
the idea that there should be constitutional protection for the full
range of the defendant's contractual expectation interests. 58 In
Mabry, a prosecutor withdrew his first plea agreement offer and
replaced it with a second, less favorable, offer before the defendant
could accept the first one. 59 The Court found that the defendant's
subsequent plea of guilty was in no sense "induced" by the withdrawn
offer, because at the time the defendant entered his plea he was fully
aware that the second agreement controlled. 60 The Court stated that
a "plea bargain standing alone is without constitutional
significance. '61
The Court held that the defendant had no
constitutional right to specific enforcement of the withdrawn plea
bargain, because the withdrawn plea bargain "did not impair the
'62
voluntariness or intelligence of his guilty plea.
Thus, in rejecting the idea that there is a constitutional
protection of the defendant's contractual expectations interests, the
Mabry Court seems to limit the constitutional analysis of plea
agreements to the question of a defendant's waiver of traditionally
recognized constitutional rights, such as the right to trial and the right
to remain silent. In line with its traditional analysis of a waiver of a
constitutional right, 63 the Mabry Court holds that a plea entered
pursuant to a plea agreement must be voluntary, and that the
defendant must be aware of the direct consequences of the plea. 64 In
short, such a plea must be voluntary and intelligible at the time at
which it is entered.

56. Id. at 513.
57. Id. at 539.
58. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507 (1984).
59. Id. at 506.
60. Id. at 510.
61. Id. at 507.
62. Id. at 510.
63. "A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
64. Mabry, 467 U.S. at 508.
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IV. The Coon Analysis of Detrimental Reliance in Plea
Agreements
In Mabry, the plea agreement had not been relied on.65 The
Court did not address the issue of whether the analysis might be
different if the plea agreement had been relied on. This was precisely
the issue presented in United States v. Coon.66 The Coon court
contended that Mabry sharply limited the extent to which the concept
of detrimental reliance could be used in the context of plea
agreements. 67 The Coon court argued that Mabry had dispelled the
notion that a defendant's contractual-like expectation interests are
relevant to constitutional analysis. 68 In Mabry, the first plea
agreement was withdrawn before the defendant did anything that
could be characterized as relying on it.69 In contrast, the defendant in
70
Coon had "spilled his guts" before the plea agreement was changed.
Coon's argument was that "after he had met with [the prosecutor]
and told him everything he knew, he could no longer pursue the
options of going to trial or further negotiating the terms of the plea
agreement."'71 He claimed "that the erroneous statement in the plea
agreement concerning the amount of the fine induced his detrimental
reliance prior to entering his plea such that he changed his position
and could not be restored to the status quo ante by pleading not
guilty and proceeding to trial."72
The Coon court held, however, that even if Coon's reliance on
the original agreement were true, it did not rise to the level of
constitutionally cognizable detrimental reliance. 73 The court stated
that when Coon plead guilty, he understood the consequences of his
action. 74 Specifically, he was aware of the maximum amount of the
penalty, and understood that under the terms of the plea agreement,
the decision as to the amount of restitution was within the sole
discretion of the trial judge.75 The court thus argued that Coon's

65. Id at 506.

66. 805 F.2d 822 (8th Cir. 1986).
67. Id at 824.
68. Id
69. Mabry,467 U.S. at 506.

70. Coon, 805 F.2d at 822.
71. Id. at 825.
72. Id

73. Id
74. Id.
75. Id
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guilty plea had satisfied the knowing (intelligibility) requirement for
76
his waiver of his constitutional right to trial.
The court then turned to the question of the voluntariness of his
plea. The court held that "[t]he only change in position that can be
considered 'detrimental reliance' is the actual entry of an involuntary
guilty plea. '77 The court held that "[n]ot until that point has the
defendant been deprived of any constitutionally protected liberty
interest. ' 78 The court held that "when, as in this case, the defendant
learns of a change in the terms of a plea agreement prior to entering
his plea, a detrimental reliance argument is inappropriate [because],
at that stage, the defendant still had the option of pleading not guilty
'79
and proceeding to trial.
The court argued that "Coon's option to proceed to trial [was
not] foreclosed because of his earlier cooperation with the federal
agents." 80 Citing Brain v. United States,81 the court argued that "[i]f
his cooperation was induced by the prosecutor's misrepresentation as
to the amount of the fine, then the court [could have determined]
whether the statements were involuntary and, if they were, exclud[ed]
them from evidence at trial." 82 With this remedy, the status quo ante
would have been restored.83 Coon could have entered a plea of not
guilty and have been in no worse position than if the plea agreement
had not existed. 84 The Coon court cited Mabry as standing for the
general proposition that as long as the defendant is not in a worse
position, there is no detrimental reliance. 85 The court held that,
because Coon could have rejected the second agreement and
proceeded to trial without being in any worse of a position than he
would have been if he had not cooperated, then there was no need to
uphold specific performance of the terms of the first plea
agreement. 86 The court thus argued that the possible remedy of going
to trial was constitutionally adequate.87

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 824.
Id. at 825.
Id. (citing Mabry v. Johnson,467 U.S. 504,507 (1984)).
Id.
Id.
168 U.S. 532 (1897).
Coon, 805 F.2d at 825.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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V. Criticism of the Coon Definition of Detrimental Reliance
The Coon court cites to the authority of Mabry in its definition
and analysis of detrimental reliance. 88 However, the Mabry Court
Mabry stands for the
never discussed detrimental reliance.
proposition that an un-relied-upon plea agreement does not implicate
the Constitution. 89 The Coon court presents the holding of Mabry as
stating the broader proposition that, prior to the entry of a guilty plea,
nothing connected to a plea agreement implicates the Constitution.90
However, arguably, many activities performed pursuant to a
proffered plea agreement may implicate constitutional rights, and
thus may be constitutionally cognizable detrimental reliance. 91 The
most obvious example is the one presented by the facts of Coon itself:
pre-plea cooperation may implicate the self-incrimination clause.
The Coon court seeks to avoid the idea that the self-incrimination
clause can ever be the constitutional basis of a detrimental reliance
claim by the following argument: any act of self-incrimination elicited
in reliance on a proffered plea agreement can be designated
involuntary and, on that basis, can be excluded at trial. Because selfincriminating evidence can be excluded, the defendant can always be
returned to the status quo ante position, and thus a defendant's
reliance in the form of self-incrimination can never be "detrimental"
to a defendant's option of proceeding to trial. Therefore, no
incriminating statement made in reliance on a proffered plea
agreement is constitutionally cognizable detrimental reliance.
The Coon court's argument seems strong, but it falters in its last
step of returning the defendant to the status quo ante. There are two
distinct but related problems here. The first problem is the standard
by which Coon's incriminating statements could be considered
"involuntary," and thus excluded at trial. The second problem is the
scope of the exclusion of the involuntary statements. These problems
arise because the Coon court sets forth an argument that implicates
constitutional standards for involuntary confessions but neglects to
consider the complications of applying these standards to plea
agreements. Indeed, the Coon court avoids even mentioning the
Fifth Amendment. However, by citing Brain v. United States,92 which
88. Id.
89. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504,510-11 (1984).
90. Coon, 805 F.2d at 825.
91. Thus in the Navarroli case where the defendant engaged in dangerous undercover
work as part of the terms of his proffered plea agreement, it could be argued that this
implicated his constitutional right to liberty.
92. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
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is the fountainhead of Fifth Amendment involuntary confession
cases, 93 the Coon court is committing itself to the current
constitutional standards for involuntary confessions. 94
As I will discuss in the next section, in order for a confession to
be excluded as involuntary under the Constitution, the circumstances
surrounding the confession have to either violate Miranda,
implicating the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment, or
shock the conscience, implicating the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 95 I will argue that the circumstances of
Coon's confessions do neither.
Furthermore, even if Coon's
confession were found to be constitutionally involuntary, this would
not mean that every consequence of the confession could be excluded
from trial. For the Coon court's argument to work, all uses of the
confession would have to be excluded, both for the case in chief and
for impeachment purposes. Furthermore, all fruits of the confession
would also have to be excluded. Nowhere in modern constitutional
case law is there support for such a sweeping exclusionary rule for
involuntary confessions.
Ironically, because Coon's incriminating statements would not be
recognized as involuntary confessions according to modern
constitutional law, Coon can claim detrimental reliance under the
Coon court's own reasoning. For, in order to deny his claim of
detrimental reliance, the Coon court must be able to say that Coon
could have been returned to the status quo ante through an exclusion
of his incriminating statements. Thus the court must have some basis
for excluding these statements. However, because Coon's statements
would not be considered involuntary confessions under modem
constitutional law, the court has no basis for excluding them, and thus
Coon cannot be returned to the status quo ante. Therefore the Coon
court's argument is turned back against itself. Even according to the
Coon court's own definitions and logic, Coon has detrimentally
relied.
VL Fifth Amendment Standards for Involuntary Confessions
The Coon court asserts that if a defendant's pre-plea confession
were "induced by the prosecutor's misrepresentation as to the
amount of the fine, then the court can determine whether the
statements were involuntary, and, if they were, exclude them from
93. See infra note 98.
94. Coon, 805 F.2d at 825 (citing Bram, 168 U.S. at 542-43).
95. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 431-33 (2000).
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evidence at trial. '96 As authority for this rule, the court cites the 1897
Supreme Court case, Brain v. United States, stating in a parenthetical
its holding that an "involuntary confession must be excluded from
evidence; voluntariness determined by whether it was 'extracted by
any sorts of threats or violence [or] obtained by any direct or implied
promises, however slight, [or] by the exertion of any improper
influence."' 97 On its face, this is an odd standard for the Coon court
to be using in a plea agreement case, because, if taken literally, this is
a standard that would invalidate all plea agreements. All plea
agreements, after all, are based on promises that are more than
"slight."
Brain is the great fountainhead of Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence on involuntary confessions. 98 By citing it, the Coon
court is committing its argument to this body of law. However, the
standard laid out in Brain has been superceded by twentieth-century
developments, and the Supreme Court has stated that this passage
from Brain does not state the standard for determining the
voluntariness of a confession under current precedent. 99 Therefore,
to address the issues of voluntariness that the Coon court's own
definition of detrimental reliance implicates, the facts of Coon must
be analyzed in relation to the substantial body of constitutional law
on involuntary confessions developed by the Supreme Court in this
century, starting with Brown v. Mississippi'0° and culminating in the
recent Dickerson v. United States decision, which has reaffirmed the
constitutionality of Mirandaand its progeny.
In Dickerson, the Court affirmed the two traditionally
recognized "constitutional bases for the requirement that a confession
be voluntary to be admitted into evidence: the Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination and the Due Process Clause of the
Brain is the first in the line of Fifth
Fourteenth Amendment."''
Amendment cases, and held that the voluntariness requirement "is
96. Coon, 805 F.2d at 825 (citing Brain, 168 U.S. at 542-43). See also Rachlin v. United
States, 723 F.2d 1373, 1377 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Grant, 622 F.2d 308, 316-17
(8th Cir. 1980) (court must view the totality of the circumstances and exclude defendant's
statement if the product of an overborne will).
97. Coon, 805 F.2d at 825.
98. See, for example, its citation in the recent Dickerson decision as the beginning of
Fifth Amendment line of cases of involuntary confessions. 530 U.S. at 431. For an
analysis of the history of the Brain standard, see Melissa L. Eaton, Coerced Confessions,
Harmless Error,and Arizona v. Fulminante, 23 U. TOL. L. RIv. 849, 851-55 (1992).
99. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,285 (1991).
100. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
101. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 431-32.
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controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States commanding that no person 'shall
' 1°2
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
Brown v. Mississippi is the first case to exclude a confession based on
Fourteenth Amendment, due process, grounds; in Brown, the Court
reversed a criminal conviction under the Due Process Clause because
10 3
it was based on a confession obtained by physical coercion.
As the Court states in Dickerson:
While Brain was decided before Brown and its progeny, for the
middle third of the 20th century [the Court] based the rule against
admitting coerced confessions primarily, if not exclusively, on
notions of due process.

[The Court] applied the due process

the era
voluntariness test in some 30 different cases decided during
1°4
that intervened between Brown and Escobedo v. Illinois.

Thus, before Miranda, the constitutionality of custodial
interrogations were determining by judging the voluntariness of the
confession, which the Court undertook on a case-by-case basis.
Although the Court attempted to set out general rules for
determining voluntariness, 105 the Court never succeeded in making
the standard clear to either itself or the lower courts. 106 Thus
Miranda can be seen as an attempt to eliminate the inherent
ambiguities of the voluntariness standard. Instead of continuing to
analyze each custodial interrogation case by case, in Miranda, the
Court stated that the situation of custodial interrogation is inherently
coercive. 10 7 Unless the proper Miranda warnings are given, there is
10 8
an irrebutable presumption that the confession was involuntary.
The creation of the Miranda warnings did not however eliminate
Fourteenth Amendment, due process voluntariness analysis as a
grounds for rejecting a confession. 10 9 Even if a defendant received
adequate Miranda warnings, there could still be exceptional cases in
which the subsequent confession could be considered involuntary,
102. Bram, 168 U.S. at 542.
103. 297 U.S. at 287.
104. Dickerson,530 U.S. at 432 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
105. See, for example, Frankfurter's lengthy disposition in Culombe v. Connecticut,367
U.S. 568 (1961).
106. See Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the Good
Old Days of PoliceInterrogation,48 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 749-50, 754-55 (1987).
107. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966).
108. "Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion
inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be
the product of free choice." Id.
109. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298,307 (1985).

January 20011

UNITED STATES V. COON

where torture or drugs were used, for example. However, the
standard is "shock the conscience," a very high standard indeed."0
The Miranda warnings are presumed to be an adequate guard
against psychological coercion, and to give defendants enough
knowledge about the effects of their confessions to render such
confessions "knowing."' Thus in Oregon v. Elstad the Court stated
the general principle that "[t]his Court has never embraced the theory
that a defendant's ignorance of the full consequences of his decisions
vitiates their voluntariness."" 2 In short, once the authorities give the
Miranda warnings they are not also obliged to explain all the other
possible negative consequences that confessing might have in the
defendant's particular case. Indeed, the authorities are not even
obliged to tell the truth to a defendant who agrees to talk to them
after the defendant has waived his or her Mirandarights: many forms
of trickery used to illicit confessions do not render a confession
involuntary in the eyes of the Court." 3 In Elstad, the Court reviewed
these two areas of nondisclosure and trickery that nonetheless do not
render a confession involuntary:
[Tihe Court has refused to find that a defendant who confesses,
after being falsely told that his codefendant has turned State's
evidence, does so involuntarily. The Court has also rejected the
argument that a defendant's ignorance that a prior coerced
confession could not be admitted in evidence compromised the
voluntariness of his guilty plea. Likewise, in California v.
Beheler... the Court declined to accept defendant's contention
that, because he was unaware of the potential adverse
consequences of statements made to the police, his participation in
the interview was involuntary. Thus we have not held that the sine
qua non for a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to remain
silent is a full and complete appreciation of all the consequences
114
flowing from the nature and quality of the evidence in the case.

110. See id. at 312 & n.3.
111. "For those unaware of the privilege [to remain silent], the warning is needed
simply to make them aware of it-the threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as
to its exercise. More importantly, such a warning is an absolute prerequisite in
overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere." Miranda,384 U.S. at
468.
112. Elstad,470 U.S. at 316.
113. Thus one commentator states that the Court has never held a confession
inadmissible based purely on deception. See Richard A. Leo, From Coercion to
Deception: The Changing Nature of Police Interrogation in America, 18 Crime &
Delinquency 35,47 (1992).

114. Elstad,470 U.S. at 317.
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This summary from Elstad illustrates the great change in
involuntary confession jurisprudence that has taken place since Brain.
Bram, as applied by Coon, asserts that "a confession, in order to be
admissible, must be free and voluntary; that is, must not be extracted
by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or
implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper
influence."11 5 As one can see from the summary from Elstad, a great
deal of what once might have fallen under the phrase "exertion of any
improper influence" is now no longer considered the basis by which
Because
to make a constitutional claim of involuntariness.
compliance with the Miranda warnings is now the presumed
safeguard against psychological coercion, very little leeway is left for
making an argument that confessions taken in accordance with
11 6
Mirandaare psychologically coerced.
VII. The Voluntariness of Coon's Confession under Modern
Constitutional Standards
There are two moments at which one could argue that Coon's
actions were involuntary. The first moment is when Coon accepted
the terms of the first plea agreement and agreed to cooperate, which
included disclosing self-incriminating facts. The second moment is
when he accepted the terms of the second plea agreement and agreed
to enter a guilty plea in court according to those terms. These two
moments involve two very different kinds of actions from the
perspective of a voluntariness analysis. The first moment involves the
voluntariness of his decision to cooperate and thus to self incriminate,
which we can call the voluntariness of his confession. The second
moment involves the voluntariness of his pleading guilty according to
the second plea agreement, which we might call the voluntariness of
his acceptance of the final bargain.
The argument that his actions in the first moment, leading to the
confession, were involuntary can be based on either of the following:
(1) assuming a good faith mistake on the part of the authorities, his
cooperation and confession was not "knowing and intelligent"
because the terms that induced him to cooperate were subsequently
changed, or (2) assuming bad faith on the part of the authorities, he
115. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897).
116. As the Court said in Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984), "[c]ases
in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement
was 'compelled' despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the
dictates of Miranda are rare."
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was tricked by the use of "bait and switch" tactics to get him to
cooperate and confess. Both of these arguments are based on the
premise that he did not know nor was he told by the authorities that
the terms of any plea agreement can be changed at any time prior to
the entry of the guilty plea.
However, according to standard laid out in Elstad,u 7 neither of
these arguments, his ignorance, nor the authorities failure to inform
him of all the possible consequences of confessing, is grounds for
rendering a properly Mirandized confession involuntary according to
the Fifth Amendment. It is true that one could alternately appeal to a
Fourteenth Amendment, due process, shock the conscience argument
as a basis of involuntariness. However, given the things that do not
shock the conscience of the court as listed in Elstad, it is unlikely that
a good faith, or even a bad faith change in one of the terms of a plea
agreement would meet that standard.
It is the second moment, the events leading up to Coon's
acceptance of the second plea agreement, for which one can make a
stronger involuntariness argument. Here one has the inverse
situation of the first moment. In accepting the second plea
agreement, Coon knew what he was ultimately getting, but he may
have felt that he had no choice but to accept it. Coon knew and
understood how the terms had been revised in the second agreement;
he was not under the delusion that he was receiving the terms of the
first. However, as to the voluntariness of his decision, Coon has
plausible claims to either objective duress or psychological coercion
or both. The duress argument is that because the use of his
confession at trial would objectively have made it unlikely for Coon
to prevail at trial, Coon was forced to accept the terms of the second
plea agreement and plead guilty. The psychological coercion
argument is that, because Coon believed that his earlier confession
would be introduced at trial, he felt he had to accept the terms of the
second plea agreement and plead guilty.
If the objective duress argument is valid in this case, then so too
is the psychological coercion argument because then the subjective
and the objective points of view would lead to the same result, an
involuntary guilty plea. The argument of the Coon court presupposes
that, as an objective matter of law, Coon's self-incriminating
statements could have been excluded at trial. The court is thus
arguing that the objective legal fact of exclusion was sufficient to
protect Coon's constitutional rights, regardless of what Coon may
117. 470 U.S. at 317.
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have actually believed at the time he accepted the terms of the second
plea agreement.
The facts in Elstad are similar to those of Coon. In Elstad there
were two confessions, the first one clearly illegally induced and the
second one taken in accordance with Miranda. The question
presented was whether the taint of the first confession automatically
tainted the second. In Elstad the police initially questioned the
defendant without Mirandizing him and obtained a voluntary
confession.11 8 They subsequently Mirandized him and obtained a
second confession. 119 At Elstad's trial, the first confession was
excluded. But the defendant argued that, because the first confession
had been illegally elicited, it tainted the second one as "fruit of the
poisonous tree," and therefore that the second confession should be
excluded as well.120
The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine emerged from Fourth
Amendment, illegal search and seizure cases. The Court has held
that evidence and witnesses discovered as a result of a search in
121
violation of Fourth Amendment must be excluded from evidence.
However, the Elstad Court refused to extend the poisonous tree
doctrine to Fifth Amendment involuntary confession cases.122 The
Court held that since the first confession was voluntary, extending the
Miranda exclusionary principle to a subsequent properly Mirandized
and voluntary confession would not serve the main purpose of the
Miranda warnings, which was to discourage involuntary
confessions. 123 Thus, drawing an analogy between the two cases, one
can say that even if Coon's initial confession were somehow held to
be excludable under the Fifth Amendment, this would not necessarily
taint Coon's guilty plea according to the second plea agreement,
which in this regard would be like Elstad's second confession.
The Coon court's assertion that a defendant can be restored to
the status quo ante has some plausibility for a defendant in Elstad's
situation. According to an objective legal analysis, Elstad could be
returned to the status quo, because his first confession was excludable
as a Miranda violation. However, Elstad also presented the second
possible argument, the argument that his circumstances led to his
118. 470 U.S. at 301.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 302.
121. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). There are a number of
exceptions that limit the scope of the doctrine. See infra note 129.
122. Elstad,470 U.S. at 304.
123. Id. at 306-07.
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subjective belief that he had no alternative but to confess: "The
Oregon court [before which Elstad originally appeared] identified a
subtle form of lingering compulsion, the psychological impact of the
subject's conviction that he had let the cat out of the bag and, in so
doing, has sealed his own fate."'124 The Supreme Court, however,
rejected this argument, stating: "This Court has never held that the
psychological impact of voluntary disclosure of a guilty secret
qualifies as state compulsion or compromises the voluntariness of a
subsequent informed waiver."'1 5 This assertion by the Court
forecloses a Fifth Amendment claim of involuntariness based on
psychological coercion.
Furthermore, the Coon court's approach does not work even if
one assumed for the sake of argument that Coon's confession could
be deemed involuntary under the Fifth Amendment. In order for
Coon to truly be returned to the status quo ante, not only the
confession, but all possible uses of the confession, including
impeachment use, and all fruits of that confession would also have to
be excluded. In the Fifth Amendment Miranda cases, even if a
confession is held to be involuntary, it can nonetheless be used at trial
for impeachment purposes. 126 And, as just discussed, Elstad holds
that the fruits doctrine does not apply to Fifth Amendment
involuntary confession cases. 27
Finally, it is not even clear that Coon's confession could be
excluded from all uses at trial even if it were somehow held
involuntary under the stricter standard for involuntariness required
by a due process, Fourteenth Amendment analysis. The early "shock
the conscience" tortured confession cases, such as Brown v.
Mississippi, seemed to imply that all fruits of such involuntary
confessions would be excluded. 28 However, these cases were decided
before the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine was developed for
Fourth Amendment cases. More importantly, these cases were
decided before the exceptions to the fruit of the poisoned tree
doctrine were developed. 29 The Supreme Court has never decided
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at311.
Id. at 312 (quoting United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540-41 (1947)).
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222,224-25 (1971).
See also Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S.

649 (1984).
128. 297 U.S. 278 (1936). In Brown, the only evidence was the tortured confession, so
the case had to be dismissed. Id. at 287.
129. These exceptions include when: (1) There is an attenuated relationship between
the illegal search and the confession, see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963);
(2) The evidence comes from an independent source, see Murray v. United States, 487
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these questions; so there is no assurance that, even if a confession
were held involuntary on Fourteenth Amendment grounds today, all
possible fruits of it would be excluded. However, it is precisely this
legal assurance that the Coon court requires in order to justify its
claim that Coon can be returned to the status quo ante.
Conclusion
The foregoing analysis has attempted to show that the definition
of detrimental reliance presented by the Coon court is selfcontradictory, and that it results in an impossible double-bind for
Coon: he is denied the remedy of detrimental reliance because the
court asserts that he can be returned to the status quo ante, because
his incriminating statements could be excluded at trial. However, the
foregoing analysis has shown that under current Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment analysis, Coon's confession would not be considered
involuntary, and thus could not be excluded from evidence. Because
Coon cannot be guaranteed a return to the status quo ante position,
according to the Coon court's own logic, Coon has detrimentally
relied. In this situation the fact that he has detrimentally relied
means that the only adequate remedy is specific enforcement of the
terms of the first plea agreement. Rescission of the second plea
agreement could only be an adequate remedy if rescission could
return Coon to the status quo ante position. But if Coon could be
returned to that position, he would not be able to show detrimental
reliance. In this situation, the standard for detrimental reliance and
specific performance are logically linked.
The Coon court also presents an alternative basis for denying
Coon's claim of detrimental reliance. The court held that "even if...
detrimental reliance [were] the appropriate standard for analyzing the
voluntariness of Coon's plea,... Coon presented insufficient
evidence at the hearing on his Rule 35(a) motion to show that he
detrimentally relied on the misrepresentation. 1 30 The issue here is
whether the misrepresentation was material to his decision, that is,
whether it affected his decision to plead guilty. The Coon court held
that it did not, pointing to evidence in the form of testimony by
Coon's lawyer that the focus of his conversations with Coon about
accepting the first plea agreement concerned the amount of time that

U.S. 533 (1988); (3) The evidence would have inevitably been discovered, see Nix v.
Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
130. Coon, 805 F.2d at 825.
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Coon was going to serve. 131 Coon himself testified that he "could not
say" whether he would have entered the guilty plea if32 the first plea
agreement had correctly stated the amount of the fine.
I do not criticize this second basis for the court's holding. The
main purpose of this Note has been to make the case that situations
such as Coon's should be presumed detrimental reliance. However,
once that presumption is in place, it is legitimate for the government
to try to rebut that presumption by proving that there had been no
reliance because the changed term was not material. Allowing the
government to make the case that a changed term did not affect the
inducing of the plea agreement does, of course, provide less
protection to the defendant. But allowing a materiality qualification
is consistent with the application of detrimental reliance in other
areas of the law. This is a fair and necessary qualification as long as
the burden is on the state to show that the changed term did not
materially affect the inducing, rather than on the defendant to prove
that it did.
As my analysis above has shown, because plea agreements are a
unique hybrid of contract and criminal procedure law, the contours of
the constitutional protection for plea agreements are unclear.
Because of this, some commentators have urged that the Supreme
Court recognize a general constitutional protection for contractual
expectations for plea agreements, whether relied upon or not.133
However, the legal reality reflected by Mabry is that the Supreme
Court is currently unwilling to extend broad constitutional
protections to plea agreements. While this remains the law, the best
that supporters of defendants' rights in plea agreement situations can
do is to try to resist any encroachments on those protections that the
law already recognizes. The approach of the Coon court would
define away detrimental reliance as a protection. This approach, I
have argued, is inconsistent with the general trend by courts to
134
recognize detrimental reliance in the context of plea agreements.
Therefore I have attempted to show how Coon is a flawed decision,
and I urge that it not be followed.

131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 826.
d.
See supra note 9.
See supra note 40.

